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Abstract
It has been suggested that some of the puzzles of QM are resolved if we al-
low that there is retrocausality in the quantum world. In particular, it has
been claimed that this approach offers a path to a Lorentz-invariant ex-
planation of Bell correlations, and other manifestations of quantum “non-
locality”, without action-at-a-distance. Some writers have suggested that
this proposal can be supported by an appeal to time-symmetry, claiming
that if QM were made “more time-symmetric”, retrocausality would be a
natural consequence. Critics object that there is complete time-symmetry
in classical physics, and yet no apparent retrocausality. Why should QM
be any different?
In this note I call attention to a respect in which QM is different, under
some assumptions about quantum ontology. Under these assumptions, the
option of time-symmetry without retrocausality is not available in QM,
for reasons intimately connected with the fundamental differences between
classical and quantum physics (especially the role of discreteness in the
latter).
1 Introduction
A number of writers have suggested that some of the puzzles of quantum me-
chanics (QM) are resolved if we allow that there is retrocausality in the quantum
world. In particular, it has been claimed that this approach offers a path to a
Lorentz-invariant explanation of Bell correlations, and other manifestations of
quantum “nonlocality”, without action-at-a-distance (see, e.g., [2]–[6], [9]–[18]).
Some of these writers have suggested that an argument in favour of this pro-
posal may be found in considerations of time-symmetry: that if QM were made
more time-symmetric, retrocausality would be a natural consequence. Against
the latter claim, critics object that there is complete time-symmetry in classical
physics, and yet no apparent retrocausality. Why should QM be any different?
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In this note I call attention to a respect in which QM may indeed be differ-
ent, under some assumptions about quantum ontology. Roughly, the exclusions
seem to be instrumentalism on the one side, and no-collapse versions of ontic
realism about the wave function on the other. For other views, it turns out
that the intuitively comfortable option – time-symmetry without retrocausality
– is not on the table in QM, for reasons intimately connected with the funda-
mental differences between classical and quantum physics; especially the role of
discreteness in the latter.
The crucial issue is whether the discreteness is regarded as “all there is”,
or whether continuity is also provided in the ontology, e.g., in the form of a
wave function, ontically intepreted. In the former case but not the latter – i.e.,
roughly, if we are any sort of realist other than an Everettian or a Bohmian – we
do need to make a choice between time-symmetric ontology and retrocausality
in QM, in a manner not true of classical physics.1
It is a standard assumption of Bell’s Theorem [1] and other No Hidden
Variable theorems in QM that there is no retrocausality: that hidden variables
(HVs) are independent of future measurement settings. The present argument
clarifies the relationship between this assumption and time-symmetry, and shows
that on some but not all conceptions of the preferred form of a HV theory, there
is indeed a tension between the two.
2 Polarization – classical and quantum
2.1 The classical case
We first consider the standard description in classical electromagnetism (CEM)
of the apparatus shown in Figure 1. A beam of light, linearly polarized in
direction τR, is directed towards a ideal polarizing cube set at angle σR. CEM
predicts that the beam will split into two output beams. The transmission
beam, here labelled R = 1, will have an intensity cos2(τR − σR) times that
of the input beam. The reflection beam, here labelled R = 0, will have an
intensity sin2(τR−σR) times that of the input beam. Thus in the case in which
τR = σR, all the energy goes on the transmission beam; in the case in which
τR = σR + pi/2, all the energy goes on the reflection beam; and other cases are
distributed between these extremes, in a continuous fashion. The transmission
(R = 1) and reflection (R = 0) beams have linear polarization in directions σR
and σR + pi/2, respectively.
Figure 2 shows the corresponding behaviour in the reverse case – that is,
when beams of linearly polarized light with the appropriate polarization an-
gles and intensities are directed into the polarizing cube, through what were
previously the transmission and reflection output channels. (The diagram has
1The situation for Everettian and Bohmian views is less clear. There may be other reasons
to think that they cannot entirely combine time-symmetry and one-way causality. (I discuss
the case of the Bohm view briefly in §4.5 below.) But they escape a particularly sharp
argument for the incompatibility of these options that applies to other realist views.
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been mirror-reversed, to preserve the convention that inputs come from the left
and outputs go to the right. HEre) If the input on the transmission channel,
L = 1, is polarized in direction σL with intensity cos2(τL − σL), and the input
on the reflection channel, L = 0, is polarized in direction σL+pi/2 with intensity
sin2(τL − σL), then there is an output beam with intensity 1 and polarization
τL, in the direction of the input beam in the original experiment.
R = 0
R = 1
τR
Beam
Polarizing cube
set at angle σR
L = 0
L = 1
τL
Photon
Polarizing cube
set at angle σL
Figure 1: The classical set up – right.
R = 0
R = 1
τR
Photon
Polarizing cube
set at angle σR
L = 0
L = 1
τL
Beam
Polarizing cube
set at angle σL
Figure 2: The classical set up – left.
2.2 The quantum case
Figures 3 and 4 show the quantum versions of these experiments, in the single
photon case. For the moment, to make the interesting difference with the clas-
sical case as sharp as possible, we shall assume that the outputs at R = 1 and
R = 0 and the inputs at L = 1 and L = 0 are now discrete, in the sense that
the photon leaves or enters the apparatus on one channel or other. (More later
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on the case in which the input and/or output may be a superposition.) This
requires that the factors cos2(τR − σR) and cos2(τL − σL) now represent prob-
abilities, rather than intensities.2 Thus in Figure 3, a photon with polarization
τR has a probability cos2(τR − σR) of being detected on the R = 1 channel,
and a probability sin2(τR − σR) of being detected on the R = 0 channel. (The
intensity interpretation is recovered in the limit, as the numbers of photons goes
to infinity.)
R = 0
R = 1
τR
Photon
Polarizing cube
set at angle σR
L = 0
L = 1
τL
Photon
Polarizing cube
set at angle σL
Figure 3: The QM set up – right.
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Photon
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L = 1
τL
Photon
Polarizing cube
set at angle σL
Figure 4: The QM set up – left.
3 Experimental control
We now consider the question of what can be controlled, in the CEM and
quantum cases, by experimenters who control only the polarizer settings, σL
2There are some subtleties about what these probabilities amount to, on the input side –
perhaps even about whether they are probabilities at all, on some understanding of probability
– but I set those aside, for now.
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and σR. (The reason for this restriction on what the experimenters control will
become clear as we proceed.)
3.1 The classical case
Figure 5 shows the CEM version of experiment we obtain by combining the two
previous cases. What interests us is the question of what control, if any, the
lefthand experimenter, Lena, has over the intermediate polarization, if she has
no control over the inputs at L = 1 and L = 0.
R = 0
R = 1
Polarizing cube
set at angle σR
L = 0
L = 1
τ = τL = τR
Beam
Polarizing cube
set at angle σL
Figure 5: The full classical set up.
To put this question in a stark form, imagine that the inputs L = 1 and
L = 0 are under the control of a Demon, who knows what setting σL Lena has
chosen for her polarizer. It is not difficult to see that under these conditions
the Demon can produce any intermediate polarization τ he wishes, by an ap-
propriate selection of inputs. This follows directly from the time-symmetry of
the CEM case: the inputs the Demon needs on the left are exactly the outputs
Nature produces on the right, with intermediate polarization τ and right setting
σR = σL.
Lena’s lack of control of τ on the left, in the case in which the Demon controls
the inputs, is exactly mirrored for her sister experimenter, Rena, on the right.
The intuitive reason why Rena cannot control τ by varying the right polarizer
setting σR is that (as we just noted) Nature is able to make up for any difference
in σR by a difference in intensities of the output beams R = 1 and R = 0. In
this case, τ doesn’t shift, no matter how much Rena wiggles the setting σR.
This is why there need be no retrocausality in this case, of course.3
To characterise this situation, I shall say that Lena has no input-independent
control of τ , and that Rena has no output-independent control of τ . The im-
3For future reference, note that it does not follow that there could not be retrocausality.
To block retrocausality altogether, Nature must behave as the mirror image of the perfect
obstructive Demon. Imperfect Demons, who block some but not all forward influence on the
left, correspond to ways in which Nature might be, to allow some retrocausality on the right.
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portance of the notion of input-independence is that it mimics on the front end
of the experiment precisely the question we need to consider on the back end,
to think about the possibility of retrocausality. For on the back end, on the
right, the experimenter has control of the setting, σR, but not the outcome. To
think about retrocausality, as we have just seen, we need to think about what
else she controls, if she controls only this much. Input-independence enables
us to think about the analogous issue at the input end of the apparatus, and
time-symmetry enables us to move from one case to the other. The next step
is to consider these issues in the quantum case.
3.2 The quantum case
Figure 6 shows the analogous quantum case. (It will become clear in a moment
why we should not assume that τL = τR, in this case.)
R = 0
R = 1
Polarizing cube
set at angle σR
L = 0
L = 1
τL, τR
Photon
Polarizing cube
set at angle σL
Figure 6: The full quantum set up.
It is a striking fact that in this quantum case, Lena has more control over the
left-polarization τL than in the classical case, even if the Demon retains control
of the inputs at L = 1 and L = 0. Of course, the Demon can refuse to provide
any photons at all, in which case nothing emerges from the Lena’s apparatus.
But if we assume that the Demon shares with Lena the goal of emitting photons
to the right, Lena now has complete control of τL, save only for a factor of pi/2.
For if Lena sets her polarizer to angle σL = τL, the Demon’s only choices are
to send in a photon via L = 1, in which case it emerges with polarization τL;
or to send in a photon via L = 0, in which case it emerges with polarization
τL + pi/2.4
Thus in the notation introduced above, Lena has input-independent control
of τL, up to a factor of pi/2, by means of her control of the left setting, σL. Input-
4We are still assuming that the Demon cannot supply a superposition of L = 1 and L = 0.
The physical direction of the L = 0 depends on σL, but this creates no additional difficulty
for the Demon, under our assumption that he knows what setting Lena has chosen. (Here, as
in many other places in this paper, I am indebted to Ken Wharton.)
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independent control is a new feature of the quantum case, resulting directly
from the discreteness condition QM imposes on the inputs. (As we shall see,
it disappears if we restore continuity at this point, by allowing the Demon to
input superpositions of L = 1 and L = 0.)
In the classical case, we noted not only that Lena does not have input-
independent control of τ , but also that the same is true for Rena, on the right.
She does not have output-independent control of τ , because Nature will always
absorb any change she makes to the setting σR by means of a change in the
output intensities, thus requiring no change in τ . As we noted, this is why there
is no retrocausality in the classical case (despite complete time-symmetry).
Let us now assume that the ontology of the quantum case is time-symmetric,
in the sense that there is an element of reality, or beable, which stands to σR,
R = 1 and R = 0 in precisely the same way that τL stands to σL, L = 1 and
L = 0. Let τR in Figure 6 now denote this beable. It now follows by symmetry
that Rena has precisely the same output-independent control over the value of
this beable as her sister has over the value of τL. She, too, can determine its
value up to a factor of pi/2, no matter what Nature does with the outputs on
R = 1 and R = 0.5 In particular, this means that if Rena changes the setting
σR by any amount ρ 6= pi/2, this will result in a different value of τR for any
subsequent photons. In counterfactual terms, it seems intuitively reasonable to
say of any particular case that if she had chosen σR + ρ rather than σR, the
value of τR would have been different. Thus, intuitively, she has retrocausal
control over τR, up to the factor of pi/2.
Thus, as we wanted to show, time-symmetric ontology requires retrocausal-
ity, in this case, for reasons not present in CEM. The heavy lifting here is done
by the requirement that the outputs at R = 1 and R = 0 be discrete, for it is
this that ensures that Nature lacks the degrees of freedom required to absorb the
difference of a change in σR entirely in the future. Given time-symmetry in the
ontology, retrocausality then becomes a simple consequence of the dynamical
laws.
4 Discussion
To clarify the scope and significance of this result, and the assumptions on which
it depends, I want to conclude with a brief discussion of some ways in which
it seems possible to evade the conclusion. (The following list is unlikely to be
complete, and I welcome suggestions for additions.)
4.1 Make the ontology time-asymmetric
This option avoids retrocausality, but not the main claim of this paper, which
is simply that in some interpretations of QM, time-symmetry does requires
retrocausality, in a manner not true of CEM.
5For the moment, we are still assuming that Nature cannot choose a superposition of the
two.
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This option seems likely to incur an additional cost, on top of that of the
time-asymmetry itself. Given any model with a time-asymmetric boundary-
independent ontology of the required kind, there will be another model which
is simply the time-reverse of the first. Unless there is some independent reason
to prefer one model to the other – which would be, ipso facto, a reason to
expect time-asymmetry in the domain in question – then the time-asymmetry
will have introduced an undetectable fact of the matter into our ontology, which
a symmetric model would avoid.
4.2 Avoid ontology altogether
The above argument does not go through if we deny that the usual quantum
polarization, τL is a beable, or element of reality. Hence our conclusion can
be avoided altogether by a sufficiently thoroughgoing instrumentalism about
the quantum world. This escape route is not available to proponents of the
Hidden Variable program, of course. (It is not even available to opponents of
HVs, in so far as they are interested in the project of exhibiting supposedly
undesirable consequences of the HV approach – in this context, they cannot
begin by denying their opponents’ basic premise.)6
4.3 Avoid the specific ontology of the example
A more subtle objection would be that the grounds for treating the usual quan-
tum polarization τL as a beable rest on the assumption that there is no retro-
causality. If the photon “already knows” σR, then it doesn’t seem to need the
full information carried by τL, in order to explain the correlations we find in
the full experiment, for variable σL and σR – perhaps there is no such beable
as τL. I think this is an interesting point,7 but in the present context the ob-
jector shoots himself in the foot, by invoking retrocausality in order to block an
argument in favour of retrocausality.
4.4 Restore continuity by allowing superpositions
As noted above, input-independent control disappears from the QM case, if
we allow the Demon the option of introducing a photon in a superposition
of the L = 1 and L = 0 cases. In this case, by an appropriate choice of input
amplitudes on each channel, the Demon can produce any τL he wishes, whatever
Lena’s choice of σL. (As in the classical case, this follows immediately from a
consideration of the time-reversed case, given the time-symmetry of the relevant
quantum dynamics.)
6In [7], Evans, Wharton and I argue that this option should be regarded as analogous to
the standard view of spacelike nonlocality, involving the same kind of action-at-a-distance
(though timelike, rather than spacelike).
7Among other things, it seems to bear on the question as to whether a time-symmetric
model should involve the two beables τL and τR, or better some single beable, dependent
both on σL and σR, which would combine the role of both.
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To avoid output-independence, and hence retrocausality, this option needs
to be available to Nature in Rena’s case. In most versions of QM, Rena can
frustrate Nature, simply by making a measurement on the output channels.
But some views have a loophole at this point. Everettians certainly do, for
example, for in their picture, there is no single definite outcome, whatever the
appearances in any single branch.
It might be objected that even without the Everett view, the option of
producing a superposition of R = 1 and R = 0 is still available to Nature; a
definite outcome only being needed when Rena makes a measurement.8 This
is true, but I think of limited use at this point, given the constraints of the
problem. The task is to explain the correlations observed between inputs and
outputs, in a quantum device of the kind depicted in Figure 6; and the issue
is whether an explanation can be given using a time-symmetric intermediate
dynamics and ontology, without admitting retrocausality. We have noted that
in the analogous classical problem in Figure 5, the solution depends on the
fact that the outputs may be continuously distributed between R = 1 and
R = 0. In the quantum case, it is no help to point out that superposition may
provide continuity “inside the black box”, so long as the experimental outputs
themselves remain discrete.9 The Everett view gets off the hook by denying that
the experimental outputs really are discrete, at the global level. Where there is
discreteness in the final conditions of the experiment, however, it doesn’t seem
to make any difference whether it appears at the time of the measurement, or
at some later time.
4.5 The de Broglie-Bohm view
For the Everett view, the wave function provides Nature with all the flexibility
she needs to absorb the consequences of changes in σR, within a time-symmetric
ontology, without requiring that they show up at earlier times. And the trick
seems to be available to any view that takes an ontological view of the wave
function. In particular, therefore, it is available to the de Broglie-Bohm (dBB)
view,10 despite the fact that this theory also provides discrete outputs and
inputs. Like Everettians, Bohmians can consistently combine time-symmetric
dynamics and ontology with one-way causality, at least so far as the argument
above is concerned.11
As we have noted, however, the trick that enables Nature to avoid retro-
causality in this case can be played in either direction. In the dBB picture, as
8Thanks to Richard Healey here.
9It is well-known that collapse models are time-asymmetric. This case thus illustrates one
way in which a time-asymmetric ontology can avoid retrocausality; but this conclusion is not
in tension with the claim that a time-symmetric ontology requires retrocausality, in the case
in which the outputs are discrete.
10Or at least to most versions of it: in some versions, the wave function may not be ontic,
in the required sense.
11I am setting aside the question as to whether the dBB approach can be applied to photons.
One justification for this concession is that the argument of §3.2 could be recast in terms of
spin, apparently.
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in the classical case, Nature could in principle act like the perfect Demon in
the kind of examples we have been considering, allowing retrocausation but not
forward causation. It is a nice question whether the difference would be observ-
able; or whether, as seems true in the CEM case, justification for the option
that excludes retrocausality could be found in the low entropy initial conditions
available to us in the laboratory. (The apparent difficulty concerning the latter
point is that in the single-photon limit, we are operating well “below” the sta-
tistical domain, in which this notion of a special initial condition makes sense.)
If not, then like the time-asymmetric models mention in §4.1 above, these views
appear to break a symmetry at the cost of making it unobservable which way it
is broken.12 To avoid this cost, it might be felt desirable to aim for a symmetric
model, allowing influence in both directions.
To address these issues, we need to step back a bit, and think about what
is at stake. One of the attractions of examples like that of Figure 6 is that they
make it easy to pose the relevant questions, without surreptitiously introducing
a bias in one direction or other. The symmetries of the model make any bias
easily visible.
“Intuitive causality” clearly involves such a bias: we find it natural to say
that if Rena had chosen a different setting, that difference would have made
no difference to the photon arriving from the left, but might have affected the
result to the right; but very unnatural to say that if Lena had chosen a different
setting, that difference would have made no difference to the photon departing
to the right, but might have affected the input from the left. We have seen
that if the ontology is time-symmetric, and the outputs at R = 1 and R = 0
are discrete, this asymmetry is unsustainable – we are forced to revise our view
about Rena’s case. But where does the intuitive bias come from in the first
place? And what reason, if any, do we have in continuing to take it for granted,
in a case such as the dBB theory?
Our simple model helps with the first of these questions. In the classical
case, the obvious difference between Lena and Rena is that Lena controls both
the σL and the inputs L = 1 and L = 0; whereas Rena controls only the
setting σR. We introduced the Demon in order to restore symmetry, but what
breaks symmetry, normally, is the fact that there is no Demon: on the contrary,
experimenters control their inputs, too.13
But if this is the right story about the source of the bias in the classical case,
it seems to cast doubt on our entitlement to retain the bias, in the single-photon
case. Intuitively, Lena does have enough control over the classical input beams
to ensure that they would have been the same (from the same directions, with
the same intensities and the same polarizations), if she had chosen a different
measurement setting. She does not have enough control over the behaviour of
a single-photon source to ensure that the same photon would have entered the
apparatus, with the same properties, if she had chosen a different measurement
12It wouldn’t do to argue that the Demon would have to depend on incredible prearranged
conspiracies, for the question is why these should be acceptable in one direction but not the
other.
13A fact which relies on the availability of low entropy sources, presumably.
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setting. “Intuitive” causality tells us that a different setting wouldn’t have made
any difference; but in this case, unlike in the classical case, the intuition isn’t
backed up by anything that Lena can actually do.
Again, our argument shows that the intuitive view must be wrong, given
time-symmetry, in some versions of a QM account of this case. While the dBB
theory is not one of those versions, escaping an argument for the conclusion that
the intuitive view is mistaken is not the same as offering an argument that it
is not mistaken. It is unclear what form the latter argument might take, for a
proponent of the dBB view.14
Intriguingly, there are hints of an argument for the opposite conclusion –
i.e., for the view that the dBB view should reject intuitive causality at the
fundamental level, in favour of a symmetric picture. Goldstein and Tumulka [8]
have offered a dBBB “toy model”, in which microcausal retrocausality provides
a Lorentz-invariant explanation of the Bell correlations. This model differs in
some ways from other retrocausal proposals (e.g., [2]–[6], [9]–[18]) for reconciling
these correlations with special relativity, but the underlying strategy is exactly
the same: zig-zag causality, retrocausal on one arm, provides a decomposition
of Bell’s spacelike correlations into a product of timelike correlations.15
Suppose it were to turn out that abandoning intuitive causality at the fun-
damental level, in favour of a symmetric picture, provided a successful route
to a Lorentz-invariant formulation of the dBB theory; and that we were con-
vinced that this was the only way to make the theory Lorentz-invariant. We
would then have a basis for an analogue of the argument of §3.2, within the
dBB framework, in which Lorentz-invariance played the role of discreteness: if
Nature is constrained to be Lorentz-invariant, She simply does not have the
option of absorbing all counterfactual changes of σR in the future, but must
allow Rena a degree of output-independent control of the past.16
4.6 Summary
To put the second, fourth and fifth options in perspective, it is worth noting
that the relative merits of the views of QM in question – e.g., instrumentalist
views, for option (2), the Everett view, for option (4), or the dBB theory, for
option (5) – depend on the demerits of alternative approaches. In particular,
they depend on the issue of the viability of the HV program, in the “just the
particles” sense – views which combine the HV program with an epistemic view
of the quantum state.
14As we noted earlier, avoiding retrocausality, while allowing Lena the degree of control
the experimental results require, requires that Nature behave as a perfect Demon from the
future, but at best as a very imperfect Demon from the past. This asymmetry would be easy
to explain if we could simply assume intuitive causality, but it is highly puzzling if our task
is to justify such an assumption, in the case in question.
15The main difference is that in the proposal in [8], the zig-zag goes initially via the future,
rather than initially via the past (see [8], Figure 4, p. 563).
16For a friend of retrocausality, it would be an enormously satisfying result if two of the
great lessons of Einstein’s annus mirabilis, the quantisation of light and Lorentz-invariance,
were to converge in this way, in support of a realist view of the quantum world.
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The present result contributes to clarifying this issue, in the following sense.
Bell’s Theorem and other No Hidden Variable results rely on the assumption
that HVs are independent of future measurement settings – an assumption with
considerable intuitive appeal, against the background of the one-way causality
familiar in ordinary life. However, the present argument shows that within the
framework to which such a HV program is committed – a framework in which
discreteness is not offset by non-epistemic continuity at the level of the state
function – a blanket prohibition on retrocausality is incompatible with time-
symmetry, in a manner specific to the QM case. This may provide some new
justification for re-examining the assumption in question, and for exploring HV
approaches that relax it. The photon polarization experiment discussed in §3.2
may well provide a useful model for investigating these questions, under the
assumptions of time-symmetry and discrete outputs.17
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